The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace by Radin, Margaret Jane & Wagner, R. Polk
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 73
Issue 4 Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory Article 13
October 1998
The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace
Margaret Jane Radin
R. Polk Wagner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret J. Radin & R. P. Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1295
(1998).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol73/iss4/13
THE MYTH OF PRIVATE ORDERING: REDISCOVERING
LEGAL REALISM IN CYBERSPACE
MARGARET JANE RADIN & R. POLK WAGNER*
INTRODUCTION
The legal realists of the 1920s and '30s demonstrated that all law
is "public"-that is, dependent upon the state. Contrary to laissez-
faire ideology, the "private" legal regimes of property and contract
presuppose a "public" regime of enforcement and policing, a baseline
of background rights. Private land ownership rights are limited by
nuisance law; private contract rights are limited by doctrines of du-
ress, fraud, unconscionability, and public policy.' The realist demon-
stration was repeated by the critical legal theorists of the 1970s and
'80s. Sometimes the "crits" used postmodernist methodology-"pri-
2vate" and "public" can be "flipped"-but the insight was the same.
Why did the realist demonstration need to be repeated by the crits
two generations later? Perhaps because of the persistent mythologi-
cal force of laissez-faire ideology in our culture.
That mythological force is still with us. In fact, it seems to be
waxing. So the demonstration now needs to be repeated in cyber-
space. The essays for this symposium by Professors William (Terry)
* Margaret Jane Radin is the William Benjamin Scott & Luna M. Scott Professor of Law
at the Stanford Law School and a Co-Director of the Stanford Program in Law, Science and
Technology. R. Polk Wagner is a graduate of the Stanford Law School and the University of
Michigan. Thanks to Dan L. Burk, William W. Fisher III, Jane C. Ginsburg, Ira V. Heffan,
David R. Johnson, Mark A. Lemley, and David G. Post for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
2. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 242-68 (1987); Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1010-13 (1985);
Duncan Kennedy, Stages of the Decline of the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349, 1349-50 (1982); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1219-59 (1985).
The crits' focus on "flippability" underscored a point that theorists since Hobbes have
regularly recognized: the ultimate sovereign authority that lays down rules itself rests upon the
cooperation of those that accept the rules, so even top-down sovereignty can be "flipped" to
show it rests on bottom-up cooperation. The struggle to understand how to think about sover-
eignty in the global networked environment, we argue in this comment, needs to move beyond
such oversimplified opposition, whether propounded by the left or the right.
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Fisher and Niva Elkin-Koren set about this task. One more time,
there can be no free-standing purely "private" regime of property and
contract. One more time, property and contract presuppose limits
and enforcement shaped by a sovereign authority.
I. THE AMBIGUOUS IDEAL OF PRIVATE ORDERING
A. Law and Anarchy
The ideal of "private ordering" in cyberspace excites many peo-
ple. Because the commercial environment is now global, but legal
sovereignties are still territorial, it is unclear how (or if) cyberspace
will be structured and governed. In these circumstances, because of
the continued force of laissez-faire ideology, some people hope to fi-
nesse the question of territorial jurisdiction -sovereignty -with
global "private ordering." If private ordering means legally enforce-
able contract, this hope is chimerical. The hope flourishes because
the legal realist insight has been suppressed. But once the legal real-
ist insight is revived, we can see there is an urgent question of how the
institutions of contract and property in cyberspace will be shaped and
patrolled. There is an urgent question of sovereignty: who will do the
shaping and patrolling?
There is another way to finesse the question of sovereignty. In a
regime of anarchy-as opposed to a regime of "private" law backed
by state enforcement and policing-the issue of sovereignty disap-
pears. Insofar as the advocates of private ordering are thinking of re-
gimes of customary norms with no enforcement and policing mecha-
nisms other than people's continuing commitment to them, they are
thinking of anarchy, not law. In an anarchic regime, there is no guar-
antee of due process when the group excludes someone, no recourse
for fraud, duress, or violence outside the group's own dispute-
resolution mechanisms or protection society.4 Many of those who are
excited about private ordering in cyberspace are thinking of regimes
held together entirely by customary norms, which evolve on their own
3. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. Rev. 1155 (1998); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1203 (1998); see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 144 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner
in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462,
480-515 (1998).
4. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 200-24 (1974) (arguing that
private protection societies organized by participants under anarchy will give way to a monopo-
listic protection society which will become the state).
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in the "self-organizing" networked environment
B. Top-Down and Bottom-Up: The Motto of the Anarcho-
Cyberlibertarians
In "real" space, some areas of social life are governed by law and
some by non-legal systems of norms. It seems obvious to suggest that
cyberspace will turn out to be the same. Some advocates of private
ordering, however, argue that cyberspace must either be governed en-
tirely by state-backed law or entirely by non-legal (anarchic) norms,
then vote for the latter.6 This false dichotomy stems from a resur-
gence of Friedrich Hayek's stylized distinction between bottom-up
and top-down ordering. In Hayek's scheme, top-down ordering, the
positivistic, laid-down law of the state, "central planning," is bad; bot-
tom-up ordering, the laissez-faire network of promises among indi-
viduals, the growing-up of customary norms, "private ordering," is
good.
Cyberlibertarians identify Hayek's top-down central planning
with state-backed law and his bottom-up private ordering with re-
gimes of non-legal customary norms. Thus, they should probably be
called cyberanarchists rather than cyberlibertarians; a libertarian
scheme requires strong state-backed law of property and contract.
(Actually they should be called "anarcho-cyberlibertarians" because
they are trying to be libertarians and anarchists at the same time. It
must be the power of laissez-faire ideology that causes them not to
see that one involves no property and one involves strong property).
Insofar as anarcho-cyberlibertarians are thinking of bottom-up pri-
vate ordering as a legal contractual regime, though, they (and Hayek
himself) remain subject to the realist critique. Those needed limita-
tions-principles such as duress, fraud, and due process-have to
come from somewhere and be enforced somehow. By now we know
(or should know) that they do not come from self-enforcing natural
law.
The bottom-up "versus" top-down distinction tends to be obfus-
5. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A
Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET 81-90 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997) (noting the many references to the
customary commercial norms of the "law merchant"); Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime
for 'Cyberspace', 55 U. Pr. L. REV. 993, 1051-53 (1994).
6. See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent":
Towards A New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1055, 1086-88 (1998).
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catory in cyberspace, as it is elsewhere. A regime can be character-
ized as either, depending upon how you look at it. Legislation itself is
bottom-up when considered as a good purchased by competing inter-
est groups. To some, nuisance law is unwanted top-down regulation;
to others it is a needed inherent limitation on property titles arrived
at by bottom-up coordination among neighbors. Top-down legisla-
tive regimes are no less the result of social evolutionary processes
than are bottom-up regimes of norms. Most regimes are mixed any-
way: there are myriad ways for governmental and non-governmental
organizations and individuals and groups to be intertwined with each
other in social ordering.7 Sometimes a law laid down seems best
(someone has to declare that the speed limit shall be 55); sometimes a
customary norm seems best (a validation of a usage of trade); many
times a mixture is best.
We ought to be talking about the details of good mixtures, rather
than debating top-down "versus" bottom-up. It may make no sense
for the Internet to be governed by existing nation-states (or the pow-
erful among them), and it is true that the Internet (at least in its ear-
lier non-commercial stage) has (or had) the potential for ordering a
great deal through custom rather than law. That raises interesting
questions about the role of custom in the commercialized Internet. It
does not mean that a Hayekian free-for-all is the only alternative, or
even a viable alternative, to attempted government in detail by na-
tion-states.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE
A. An Example: Internet Domain Names and Legal Trademark
Rights
In exploring the practical and theoretical issues of structuring
Internet institutions, it is useful to consider the problem of domain
names.' Domain names are addresses. In fact, domain names are
7. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 997, 1029-31 (1998).
8. Internet domain names take the form "[host].[domain].[top-level-domain]." For exam-
ple, "www.stanford.edu," where "www" is known as the hostname, "stanford" is the domain
name, and "edu" is the top-level-domain name, or "TLD." Because each Internet domain name
corresponds uniquely to what is known as an "IP address," a series of numbers that is the means
by which transmissions are routed through the Internet, the domain names themselves are nor-
mally used as addresses.
There are a limited number of TLDs, ".com" being the best-known; corporations and indi-
viduals wishing to establish an Internet presence "register" their own domain names within par-
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simply overlays for addresses -a means by which the complexity of
the Internet networking protocols are separated from the user. Do-
main names require registration, but that registration requirement
developed from a need for coordination, rather than a desire to limit
the use of the "resource." Communication could not take place-at
least not without massive confusion-without coordination to ensure
that no two computers have the same address.
The "story" of domain names can be described in evolutionary
terms. When the Domain Name System ("DNS") was instituted in
the early-to-mid 1980s, the Internet was a non-commercial research
and communication tool, originally supported by the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency and administered by a loose net-
work of researchers and academics. The original concept of the do-
main name system was as a name-space commons, not as a system of
property rights.9 As in all commons, the "first-come, first-serve" con-
cept governed use rights-in fact, this continues today, with "first-
come, first-serve" being the registration policy for second-level do-
main names.10 The designers of the DNS were creating a method of
ticular TLDs. Stanford University, for example, has registered "stanford" within the ".edu"
TLD space. Various TLDs are reserved for certain types of organizations: the ".edu" name-
space is reserved for institutions of higher education; ".gov" is meant for U.S. government bod-
ies; and ".org" is typically for non-profit groups. The catch-all commercial TLD, ".com," has
become extremely popular as commercial entities have discovered the Internet. The hostnames
are designated by the domain holder-Stanford may choose the hostnames (such as "www")
within the "stanford.edu" namespace.
9. See Jon Postel, The Domain Naming Convention for Internet User Applications (visited
Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.roxen.com/rfc/rfc819.html>; see also P. Mockapetris, Domain
Names-Concepts and Facilities (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://194.52.182.96/rfc/rfc1034.html>.
10. As of early December 1998, the future of domain name registration was unclear.
Spurred by widespread dissatisfaction with the lack of competition among TLDs- ".com," for
example, has emerged as the most desired component for an Internet address-and questions
about the legitimacy of the registration authority, the United States government established a
policy that was intended to encourage transparency in domain name governance and introduce
competition between corporations offering registration services. See Management of Internet
Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (1998) [hereinafter White Paper]. Months of nego-
tiation resulted in the November 25, 1998 transfer of formal registration authority to a new non-
profit oversight corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"). See Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (visited Feb.
28, 1999) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm>. ICANN
intends to establish polices and guidelines for the registration of domain names, dispute proce-
dures, and standards for prospective registrants of additional TLDs, while ensuring order and
stability as competition for domain names is gradually introduced. See, e.g., Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.icann.org/>; Courtney
Macavinta, U.S. to Hand over Net Administration (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.news.com/
News/Item/0,4,29263,00.html>.
Network Solutions International ("NSI"), the corporation originally charged-under a
contract with the National Science Foundation-with handling the registration of individual
domain names for the popular "generic" TLDs, such as ".com," ".edu," and ".org" remains
1998]
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administering the name-space commons for the convenience of all,
not a method of selling names as private property." It was not neces-
sary to give serious thought to rights or ownership, or even what
might happen if Joe tried to take Mary's domain name. Since Joe
could easily (and prior to 1994, freely) get his own domain name that
would, given noncommercial purposes, be as good as the one he could
take from Mary, there seemed to be enough and as good left in com-
mon after Mary appropriated hers.
Demand for domain names until the mid-1990s was compara-
tively low: Network Solutions International ("NSI"), the corporation
presently charged with registering the majority of domain names, re-
ports that in October 1995, there were 156,961 total domain names
registered. 2 There was (and is) little possibility of actually "stealing"
a domain name: the technological barriers of the DNS system pre-
cluded out-and-out theft. 3 These technological and social circum-
stances meant that enforceable property rights were not worth the
price of implementing them.
Then a few years passed, and the world changed. The Internet
came to be understood as a commercial infrastructure of very great
potential power. Individual domain names started to look both
scarce and very valuable. They started to look scarce not because of
the numbers of them available, but because of the much smaller
numbers of them that Internet entrepreneurs came to deem desir-
able. 4 They started to look very valuable because there is monetiz-
heavily involved. The Commerce Department recently signed an agreement with NSI allowing
it to continue to be the sole registrar of the majority of domain names through at least the year
2000, though some competition among registrars may be introduced as early as summer 1999.
See Courtney Macavinta, Deal Extends NSI Domain Control (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,27202,00.html>; Network Solutions International (visited Feb. 28,
1999) <http://www.networksolutions.com/>.
11. "Concerns about 'rights' and 'ownership' of domains are inappropriate." Jon Postel,
New Registries and the Delegation of International Top Level Domains (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<ftp://ftp.ripe.net/rfc/rfc1591.txt>.
12. By early 1998, that figure had risen to 2,057,489. Domain name statistics through 1996
can be found at What's in a Name? (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://rs.internic.net/nic-support/
nicnews/>. More recent statistics can be found at Network Wizards (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<http://www.nw.com/>. The 1998 domain name registration information is provided by
Internet.Org. See Internet Statistics (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.internet.org/cgi-bin/
genobject/BROWSE/stats/>.
13. In July 1997, however, Eugene Kashpureff, the founder of AlterNIC, an organization
promoting competition among TLDs, reportedly managed to route most of the users trying to
reach the NSI website (www.netsol.com) to the AlterNIC site. By "redirecting" traffic intended
for NSI, Kashpureff in effect "hijacked" the "netsol.com" domain name. See Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Network Solutions Gets Court Order To Halt Redirection of Web Site Users,
WASH. POST, July 24, 1997, at E3.
14. Though some argue that sheer numbers is the root of the scarcity, this seems overly su-
[Vol. 73:1295
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able value in commercial names in a way that there is not in non-
commercial names.15 Demand mushroomed, as did registration. 6 As
simple economics would predict, a trade in names grew up; and the
expenses of exclusion became worthwhile. Conflicts developed over
domain names.17  Businesses and individuals began advertising do-
main names for sale; it was rumored that domain names changed
hands for sums on the order of $3 million. 8
In these circumstances, a clear property rights regime, with clear
enforcement mechanisms, seemed to be needed to avoid the costly
free-for-alls economists predict when non-commercial commons re-
sources suddenly become commercially very valuable. Cyberspace
has developed its own form of questionable speculation in the ab-
sence of clear property rights called "cybersquatting" or "domain
name grabbing." Domain name grabbing refers to the practice of
registering a domain name that the registrant speculates will be of
value. The typical case involves the registering of a domain name
corresponding to a major corporation or product (almost always a
recognized trademark). The domain name grabber, who can effec-
perficial-because second-level domain names can be at least 24 characters long, potential
names are amply numerous. Indeed, if a particular TLD's domain space is near capacity, one
would suspect that new registrants would use alternative TLDs. The real problem is two-fold:
first, businesses want to use the flexible nature of the domain names to describe their business
accurately ("apple.com" is much better than "aapl.com" or some other such combination); sec-
ond, businesses believe that the ".com" TLD space is the only feasible "address" to have. Thus,
since domain names must be unique, demand for "good" domain names (as defined by each po-
tential registrant) is high, but demand for less good domain names is much lower.
15. By analogy to physical space, businesses understood an important factor in the success
or failure of their on-line venture to be location. "Location" in cyberspace means domain
names. Just as a premium location in physical commercial space commands high prices, the
high-rent district of the Internet is the ".com" TLD. This rush to "stake out" valuable domain
name space is driving the exponential growth in domain name registrations. See Postel, supra
note 11.
16. See What's in a Name?, supra note 12.
17. A Wired and Newsday reporter, Joshua Quittner, registered the domain name
"mcdonalds.com" after trying unsuccessfully to prod McDonalds into a comment on the subject.
Quittner then asked readers to send in suggestions for the domain. See Joshua Quittner,
Billions Registered (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.hotwired.com/wired/2.10/departments/
e!ectrosphere/mcdonalds.html>. McDonalds eventually complained to NSI, claiming trademark
infringement. Quittner relinquished the domain in exchange for the donation of computer
equipment (including an Internet connection) to a New York public school. See Victoria Slind-
Flor, 'Domains' Are There for Taking, NAT. L.J., June 5, 1995, at A7.
18. In 1998, Compaq paid a reported $3 million to secure "altavista.com," the name and
address of its popular search engine. See Paul Farhi, A Web 'Squatter' Beats Exxon Mobil to Its
Site, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at El; see also "BestDomains" website, styled as "[t]he largest
Global Internet Name & Asset Trading Site," (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
www.bestdomains.com/domains/index.html>. The BestDomains site has this to say regarding
the price of domain names: "The short answer is, an Internet Domain Name is worth whatever
someone is willing to pay, or sell it for." Id.
1998]
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tively block the corporation from the domain name, then offers to sell
the domain name to the corporation. 9
In July 1995, NSI, in response to several cases of domain name
disputes leading to legal action (including against NSI), promulgated
the Domain Name Dispute Policy. Broadly speaking, the Policy
(which has been amended three times since) allows trademark hold-
ers to file a complaint with NSI regarding violations of "legal rights"
by a domain name. After receiving a proper complaint, NSI will en-
courage the domain-holder to relinquish the domain name. The do-
main-holder then has the burden of proving ownership of its own
trademark corresponding to the domain name within 30 days to avoid
a "hold" status. If the disputing parties cannot reach a resolution,
NSI will place the domain name on "hold" pending further action.
When a lawsuit is filed over the allocation of a domain name, NSI will
deliver allocation authority to the court . Whether the Policy is a
good one is open to serious question. The policy allows trademark
registration from foreign jurisdictions to trump senior use rights un-
der U.S. law. It allows trademark holders to get the equivalent of an
injunction before the merits have been heard. In practice, it may be
21
making matters worse rather than better.
There has been a great deal of debate about the merits or de-
merits of the Dispute Policy. At least it is evident from an evolution-
ary point of view that some such policy would be expected to come
into existence when it did. It is also important to bear in mind that
19. A recent case is Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). Toeppen
registered the domain name "Panavision.com" and demanded $13,000 to relinquish it to Panavi-
sion. See id. at 1319. (The court noted that "Toeppen's 'business' is to register trademarks as
domain names and then sell them to the rightful trademark owners." Id. at 1325). Toeppen re-
portedly registered 240 domain names, most relating to well-known trademarks. See id. at 1319.
Panavision sued Toeppen in federal court, claiming trademark infringement, state and federal
trademark dilution, and federal and state unfair competition, among others. See id. at 1318.
Panavision prevailed on the dilution claims on summary judgment; Toeppen was enjoined from
using the "Panavision.com" name and was required to transfer it to Panavision. See id. at 1327.
20. See Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
rs0.internic.net/domain-info/internic-domain-6.html>.
21. In Panavision, the district court noted: "the policy has not proven effective in resolving
domain name conflicts." Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
In operation the Dispute Policy allows trademark owners quickly, easily, and cheaply to as-
sert a claim against a domain holder. By complaining to NSI, the trademark owner can get an
offending domain name put on hold, with minimal legal costs.
There are several thorough analyses of the Dispute Policy available on the Internet. See,
e.g., Dave Graves, Domain Name Issues & Policies (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
rs0.internic.net/presentations/daveg/ispcon/sld00l.html> (presenting the NSI view); Carl Op-
pedahl, Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute Policy (vis-
ited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.patents.com/nsi/iip.sht> (criticizing the NSI approach).
[Vol. 73:1295
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evolution does not stop. This point is logically anterior to arguing the
pros and cons of the NSI approach. History could move on from
here, changing the social, technological, and economic parameters,
and cause the perceived need for property rights in domain names to
subside.
One thing that seems likely to happen is that domain names are
going to become relatively less valuable. The demand for them could
ease: more TLDs could be formed;22 and/or competitors to NSI could
become viable.23 Or the importance of domain names could subside:
sophisticated search engines, "smart browsers," agent applications, or
other technological innovations may perhaps render them largely ir-
relevant.24
It has been tempting for the various players in the commercial
transformation of the Internet to consider domain names a species of
mutant trademark. A domain name that matches a trademark does
have at least one similar function: to identify the service or product of
the owner. And it can have value to the owner in the same way that
the goodwill attaching to any other commercial name can have value:
the value is the commodified propensity of customers to choose the
named product over competing products. Moreover, trademarks are
in a sense appropriated out of the commons of language just as do-
22. The Clinton Administration's initiatives towards reform of the domain names system
assume increased numbers of TLDs. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 10, at 31,746.
23. The late Jon Postel, one of the founders of the Internet, suggested that the DNS be re-
formed to allow at least two-dozen new U.S. TLDs and "introduce competition in the top-level
domain registration business so that market forces will ensure fair prices for good services."
Postel, supra note 11. This suggestion has largely been accepted by the current White Paper.
See White Paper, supra note 10, at 31,742.
24. In this context, "search engines" refers to both "full-text searching," where the user
inputs key words or phrases and the engine (usually through a web page interface) returns a list
of pages containing the text, and "indexing" where websites are categorized. A physical space
analogy to full-text searching would be a phone book's white pages; an index is more similar to
the yellow pages. For an example of full-text searching, see Alta Vista (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<http://www.altavista.com> and for an excellent example of a Web index, see Yahoo (visited
Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.yahoo.com>.
Smart browsers would integrate the searching functions into the user's software. Instead of
interfacing with a search engine through a website, a user would simply type the search terms or
phrases into the browser itself. This effectively adds a software layer between the user and the
address, and subtracts a layer of tasks for the user. This feature has been included in Netscape
Navigator Version 4.5. See Netscape Navigator (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
www.netscape.com>.
Agent applications, or "intelligent agents," are software applications that can perform
complex tasks independently upon direction from a user. An example is the Anderson Con-
sulting "BargainFinder" agent. BargainFinder "comparison shops among Internet stores to find
the best price for a compact disc." See BargainFinder (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
bf.cstar.ac.com/bf/>; see also Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73
CHI-KENT L. REV. 943 (1998).
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main names are appropriated out of domain name space. 5 An addi-
tional advantage of a domain name is that it can be valuable both in
the sense of trademark-type "recognition" (conceptual location) and
address implementation (operational location). The consumer can
choose products based on the value of the mark, and use the mark to
find information about the product.
Trademarks in the United States traditionally have been territo-
rially-based, meaning that the property right is only good in the terri-
tory in which the user's rights have been established, so owners lo-
cated in different territories could use the same mark. Moreover,
trademarks in the United States traditionally have been compartmen-
talized, meaning that the property right is only good in the industry in
which the user's rights have been established, so that owners engaged
in different lines of business could use the same mark. But fully-
qualified domain names are unique: there is only one Internet, one
".com" TLD, and one IP address corresponding to any given name in
that domain. Therefore, under the current regime, different compa-
nies in different places cannot share the same name. 6 Domain names
are unterritorialized and non-compartmentalized. If Apple Com-
puter is the first to claim "apple.com," then Apple Records must
yield.
Additionally, trademark law expressly reserves a large portion of
the commons of language-it does not allow the registration of
"merely descriptive" terms.2 7 "Computer" cannot be a registered
mark for a computer product. In contrast, domain name space has no
such limitations-therefore, the most valuable domain names are
clearly the most generic' Moreover, trademarks that become ge-
neric can lapse back into commons, but an appropriated domain
name (as long as the servers supporting it are maintained) cannot.
Traditional trademark law is in flux right now. There is pressure
to "unterritorialize" it-harmonize national regimes and make it pos-
sible to have worldwide rights. At the same time there is pressure to
"decompartmentalize" it-eliminate industry compartmentalization
25. Traditionally, in this country, trademarks have been "appropriated" from the language
commons by using the words in commerce, gaining a commercially valuable meaning for the
user.
26. Unless they are willing to use different TLDs. See White Paper, supra note 10, at
31,746, regarding proposals to expand the number of TLDs.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994).
28. CINet, Inc., for example, reportedly paid less than $50,000 for "news.com," yet clearly it
is of great value for drawing consumers seeking news. See Mike Allen, Seeing Ad Dollars, C-Net
Multiplies Web Sites, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 16, 1996, at D4.
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and make it possible to have comprehensive rights over a name for all
products. 9 Because the concept of dilution tends towards unterritori-
alization, it is no accident that many domain name cases in this coun-
try so far have relied on the new federal anti-dilution statute, the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("Act"). 30 This statute does
decompartmentalize, but only for "famous" trademarks.31 The Act,
thus, creates a hierarchy: "famous" marks can exclude all others from
duplicating their names, whereas others can exclude only those in
their own and related product markets. Owners of "famous" marks
can use this statute to capture the domain name they want, even if
someone else got it first, but owners of non-famous marks seem to be
out of luck.32
If trademark law were to go all the way toward unterritorializa-
tion and de-compartmentalization, then it would clearly be less pro-
crustean for application to domain names. It's unlikely, however, that
this could happen. It would require both unterritorialized scope of
validity of trademarks and an unterritorialized background legal sys-
29. Modern trademark law is moving away from its roots in a common-law tort-like regime
based on notions of unfair competition towards a naked-or free-standing-property rights re-
gime. The Ninth Circuit in Panavision International v. Toeppen noted that for a defendant to
be liable under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), "[it does not
matter that he did not attach the marks to a product." 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (1998). As courts
have recognized, whereas traditional trademark law sought to primarily protect consumers, dilu-
tion laws place more emphasis on protecting the investment of the trademark owners. See, e.g.,
Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir.
1975) (finding infringement in selling unattached trademarked logos, while noting that the deci-
sion "may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public to the pro-
tection of the business interests of plaintiffs."). But cf Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage,
Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that "antidilution statutes.., do not elevate a
trademark all the way to property").
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 11 1994); see also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316; Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toep-
pen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,1236 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
31. Senator Leahy, in remarks just prior to the passage of the Act, stated that he hoped the
Act would help "stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing
marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others." 141 CONG. REC.
S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
The criteria established for determination of a "famous" mark are: (a) the degree of inher-
ent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark (i.e., its strength); (b) the duration and extent of use
of the mark; (c) the duration and extent of advertising/publicity of the mark; (d) the geographi-
cal area in which the mark is used; (e) channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used; (f) the fame of the mark in the trading areas; (g) the nature and extent of use of
similar marks by third parties; and (h) whether the mark is federally registered. See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(1).
32. Traditional (non-dilution) infringement analysis requires a showing of "likelihood of
confusion." See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D.
Or. 1997). In contrast, the dilution standard requires only a claim that the value of the mark is
lessened. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition of dilution); see also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316;
Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1227 (finding dilution, but not finding traditional infringement).
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tem to enforce them. That, of course, brings us back to the question
of sovereignty.
B. Turning to the Ideal of Self-Ordering
The domain name issue draws attention to the problem of sover-
eignty in cyberspace. Whoever wants to establish a commercial pres-
ence on the Internet must acquire a domain name, and the questions
of who has the authority to grant it, what is a permissible use, who
will sanction transgressions, etc. immediately arise. These issues
permeate the nascent law of cyberspace. The Internet, almost by
definition, collapses our traditional notions of location and the sig-
nificance of geography for sovereignty and regimes of law. Who will
decide what rights there are and who will enforce them? Will territo-
rially-based jurisdiction and choice of law as we have known it be-
come obsolete? (Next year, or forty years from now?)
It is possible to make some basic conjectures. First, the Internet
is transnational. It will not be "within" the territorial jurisdiction of
any sovereign nor subject to rules centrally laid down, unless one na-
tion becomes powerful enough to assert sole control, or unless we de-
velop world government. It seems safe to say that we are not going to
have world government with a supreme legislative authority any time
soon. The Internet is at least potentially a global market infrastruc-
ture of tremendous value, and we can postulate a general tendency of
transnational markets to bring social and political coalescence in their
wake. But that process is slow.33
Second, in the meantime, we might look to international organi-
zations and treaties to accomplish something similar on a piecemeal
basis. Imagine an international Internet governance authority that
would be charged with laying down rules, including rules about access
to domain names.' 4 But this authority would only be authoritative if
its decrees were accepted by every national sovereign, and that might
require a full-scale network of treaties or at least unanimity of official
acquiescence. We could also imagine a piecemeal process of treaty-
making, issue-by-issue-a Domain Names Property Rights Enforce-
ment Treaty, and similar accords for other kinds of intellectual prop-
33. Witness the European Union: decades after the common market was instituted, there
has been substantial development of overarching community law but the process is far from
complete. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implication for In-
ternational Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 11 (1997).
34. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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erty rights on the Internet. Some international accords dealing with
intellectual property rights are in process, chiefly the Berne Conven-
tion and the TRIPS provisions of GATT. Their history shows at
minimum that the process is uneasy and incomplete.
These difficulties give impetus to the idea of considering the
Internet as its own sui generis jurisdiction, with its own self-
governance and enforcement mechanisms. Many who are interested
in the Internet, including quite a few anarcho-cyberlibertarians, are
thinking about spontaneous ordering (self-organization) rather than
rules laid down.35 They are thinking about laws, customs, and tech-
36nological standards which are not laid down but instead grow up.
One important, indeed urgent, question for study is whether open
technological standards can grow up as the result of market interac-
tions, that is, without a governmental regulatory structure other than
a general state-backed background regime of property and contract.37
For anarcho-cyberlibertarians, there is a more basic question:
whether a state-independent background regime of property and con-
tract can grow up as customary "law." That is, under what social,
economic, and technological circumstances might customary regimes
of property and contract grow up on the Internet? On the other
hand, under what social, economic, and technological circumstances
will the Internet need a sovereign to legislate or adjudicate for it, at
least in some respects?
In this regard, it is interesting to ask why almost everyone in the
world seems to have largely accepted NSI's authority to dole out do-
35. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 1025-28; Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 81-84; Post &
Johnson, supra note 6 (advocating self-ordering and coordination over sovereign-introduced
legal rules).
As we mentioned, these dichotomous categories (spontaneous ordering versus centralized
planning) seem to be derived from the work of Friedrich Hayek. While the categories tend to
oversimplify the understanding of real-world institutions, we do not claim that these categories
are useless as a first cut at describing features of desirable approaches to law in Cyberspace, as
long as the realist insight that baselines are needed for a legal (as opposed to anarchic) regime is
kept in mind. Nevertheless, we want to suggest that the second (and subsequent) cuts should be
more fine-grained.
36. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 1019-22. Hardy, among others, notes the rise of the Law
Merchant in the medieval trade context-a growth of customs and practices consisting of certain
principles of equity and usage of trade which benefited the merchants as a whole. See id.
37. Of course, such a general background regime becomes contentious whenever one ze-
roes in on it. For example, what is the extent of property rights in information, with respect to
(say) a database consisting of a merchant's catalogue? The fact that the background regime be-
comes contentious so often when it must come into play in order to enforce a contested interac-
tion is the reason why the libertarian "minimal state" cannot be put uncontroversially into prac-
tice in order to create a background scheme of certain and strong property rights.
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main names until quite recently.38 No world government or treaty
granted it this power, nor confirmed in it the sovereign ownership of
the name space." Indeed, in the early days of this country there was
more question about the authority of the United States government
to grant out land within its own territory, until Chief Justice Marshall
held that "[c]onquest gives a title that the courts of the conqueror
cannot deny."4 It would be unimaginable to suppose that our gov-
ernment could validly grant land somewhere else in the world. Yet, it
appears that a private body, NSI, located in the U.S. and operating
under U.S. auspices, has been able to dole out "virtual land" in Cy-
berspace (in the form of domain name space).
It could be the case that the .corn and the other unterritorialized
top level domains have been held together by tacit coordination
which all understand to be profitable."' Alternatively, it could be the
case that the wide acceptance of NSI's authority was an artifact of the
earlier non-commercial Internet, and that it will now unravel under
market pressures. Achievement of stability in a self-regulated com-
mons is often thought to be dependent upon whether the cooperators
are a close-knit social group. Earlier users of the Internet may have
belonged to a close-knit social group but this is not true of Internet
users today.42
Under the tacit coordination hypothesis, the system administra-
tors choose to point their nameservers at the "official" root name-
servers in order to gain the most reliable connection to the broadest
array of other domains. The businesses and individuals registering
new domain names follow the conventional perception that the
".com" TLD is the most valuable one. According to this hypothesis,
the unplanned yet systematic coordination among the widely varied
parties using the Internet has firmly established the international
38. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 13. To be sure, there have been dissenters, such as
AlterNIC, but their impact has been limited.
39. United States government funds certainly contributed to the initial research and devel-
opment of the Internet, and government funds support the initial registration efforts-the coop-
erative agreement which established NSI's registration authority stipulated a grant of $42 mil-
lion over fifty-seven months. See NSF Cooperative Agreement No. NCR-9218742 (visited Feb.
28, 1999) <http://rs0.internic.net/nsf/agreement/agreement.html>.
40. Johnson v M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,588 (1823).
41. Yet, the realization by commercial actors of the magnitude of NSI's authority, as well
as displeasure with its practices, has led to calls for additional TLDs, competition among regis-
tration authorities, and calls for legislation to regulate domain names and trademarks. Recent
developments in the control and distribution of domain names feature such market-oriented
reforms. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Control of Domain Names Draws Alternative Proposal: Plan-
ning the Internet's Final Privatization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1998, at C3.
42. See discussion at text accompanying infra notes 44-45.
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TLDs (especially the ".com" TLD) and NSI as de facto the sole
authoritative body regarding domain names.
Similarly, a process of tacit coordination can create and maintain
technological standards, when the conditions-which we don't fully
understand and must study-are right. As David Johnson and David
Post note:
The [Internet] itself solves an immensely difficult collective action
problem: how to get large numbers of individual computer net-
works, running diverse operating systems, to communicate with one
another for the common good. And, yet, the net is really nothing
more than a set of voluntary standards regarding message transmis-
sion, routing, and reception. There is not now and never was a cen-
tral governmental body that decreed or voted to adopt a law stating
that TCP/IP is required to be used by those wishing to communi-
cate electronically on a global scale, or that HTTP is required to be
used if you wish to communicate over a particular portion of the
global network (the World Wide Web). If you connect to a neigh-
boring host and send out packets of data that conform to the proto-
col, your messages can be heard by others who have adopted the
protocol. All are free to decline to follow the standard and to obey
some other protocol, and they will communicate only to those who,
literally, speak their language.3
If tacit coordination is the right way to think about what gave
NSI its authority, then we need to consider what types of issues are
amenable to tacit coordination. That is, what kinds of problems in-
volving necessary cooperation-mutual exclusion and forbearance,
uniform standardization-can be solved through sovereignless self-
organizing coordination? And, perhaps more importantly, what kind
of problems cannot?
III. THE LIMITS OF SELF-ORDERING
A. Conditions of Coordination
We are not aware of any algorithm that describes the circum-
stances under which a regime of exclusion rights and mutual forbear-
ance-an entitlement regime-is likely to come into being through
self-organizing coordination. Achievement of stability in self-
regulated commons is often thought to be dependent on the degree to
which the cooperators are a close-knit, homogeneous cultural group.'
The old noncommercial Internet was such a group, but the new
43. Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 74.
44. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WiTHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 156-66 (1991).
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commercial Internet is not. Additionally, stable coordination is often
thought to be easier to achieve when the possible points of agreement
are stable and obvious, and when deviance by any player is very diffi-
cult and/or readily apparent." It seems that the existence of the do-
main names scheme at least roughly fits these parameters. It was de-
veloped by a close-knit homogeneous cultural group (which might
loosely be characterized as the "techie-educational community"); its
protocols were (and are) easy to adhere to; and deviance was (and is)
difficult.
Once a scheme of exclusion rights and mutual forbearance comes
about, it is still a question whether the scheme can be stably enforced
through internal self-organizing mechanisms or whether it will degen-
erate unless uniform enforcement mechanisms are laid down from
above. Is the domain names scheme-and order on the Internet in
general-a case in which external regulation is now required, or one
in which the development of protection schemes can instead be left to
the same coordination process that gave rise to the exclusion rights
themselves?
B. Self-Ordering Through Contract?
Many Internet observers are adopting the view that networks of
contracts among participants can substitute for external regulation.
For example, Johnson and Post suggest that many of the enforcement
mechanisms will be laid down by the on-line system operators, "sys-
ops," with users contracting freely to move easily among on-line
"spaces" (whether those "spaces" are Internet providers, particular
sites, or entire areas of the Internet) -thereby "voting" for the rules
and environments that they prefer. 6 Sysops would hold the ultimate
power: banishment. Johnson further suggests that the domain name
registration authorities should coordinate to condition domain name
use (and, thus, access to cyberspace) by sysops on certain basic prohi-
bitions of fraud and "force. 4 ' He suggests that such self-regulation
should also include commitment to arbitration as a means of en-
forcement of these top-level rules.'
45. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICr 67-74 (1960).
46. See Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 75.
47. See David R. Johnson, The Price of Netizenship (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://
www.cli.org/pon.html>. "Force" in this context would be, for example, launching computer vi-
ruses against one's competitors.
48. See id.
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Professor William Fisher in this symposium also proposes a re-
gime of contractual self-ordering to govern digital content on the
Internet. 9 He suggests that courts and legislators should by and large
stand aside as content creators supplant copyright-based entitlements
with contract-based entitlements. Fisher sees societal benefit in the
flexibility of contract. Contracting out of copyright will enable price
discrimination by content creators, resulting in a transfer of wealth
from consumers to content producers, and, thus, in a net increase in
production of content, whose social value Fisher presumably believes
will offset the net loss to consumers." Fisher proposes imposition of a
list of mandatory terms and default rules." (By whom they should or
could be imposed is not part of his project). He suggests that coordi-
nation around this scheme of mandatory terms and default rules will
create a stable regime for protecting digital content and thus encour-
age its production.
C. Contracts of Adhesion
How can we determine whether such a contractual ordering is
possible or desirable? Note that the examples above-the agree-
ments with the domain registries, sysops, and the content creators-
are at best contracts of adhesion. A conventional approach to adhe-
sion contracts validates them only if the terms are reasonable and/or
are foreseeable by the adhering party. In the context of mass-market
uniform adhesion contracts, a conventional economic analysis would
validate those contracts in which the package of terms won out in a
free market, indicating that the terms were preferred by consumers,
and would invalidate those that were arrived at by collusion or mar-
ket power. Under this economic analysis, adhesion contracts cannot
be deemed valid without investigating their market context.
One easy observation is that sysops and content creators may
49. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 1219.
50. See id. at 1249-50.
51. See id. at 1220, 1241. Unlike some proponents of contractual self-ordering, Fisher is
well aware of the realist point that the scope of contract as an institution must be defined and
policed by an enforcement authority. One may infer that he supposes that content producers,
being profit-maximizers, will willingly trade off the costs to them of the limits imposed by that
authority in the form of mandatory and prohibited terms against the gains to be reaped from
enforceable property rights including price discrimination.
52. See Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 81-84. Even if evolutionary theory supposes such
contracts will all exist only by consumer choice in the long run, a theory seemingly adopted by
Johnson and Post, for example, there is no reason to suppose a priori that we are looking at a
long-run equilibrium in any given case.
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find a way tacitly to standardize on onerous "take-it-or-leave-it"
terms, under threat of exclusion in the sysop case, or denial of access
to digital information in the content creation case. The optimistic
view is that the adhesive character is of no moment because exit is
easy; thousands of flowers will bloom (and only those that users
choose to pollinate will continue to exist). But a more pessimistic
view is that sysops will find a way to coordinate on onerous take-it-or-
leave-it terms, under the threat of exclusion. 3 Such coordination on
uniform take-it-or-leave-it terms amounts to imposition of a rigid en-
titlement structure.
Externalities are another problem with these sorts of contracts.
It is possible, for example, as Professor Niva Elkin-Koren and others
note, that there are more and broader-ranging externalities with in-
formation than with physical goods." Indeed, this commodified mode
of thought-looking solely at the economic impact on third parties-
does not fully capture what is at stake here, such as the formation of
self and its characteristics and preferences in the context of groups.
Contracts which concern privacy, for example, touch on a range of is-
sues beyond the economic transaction, including personal identity
and freedom. Who will decide to what extent firms may gather and
use information about customers? Will it be sufficient to validate
these practices that the consumer "clicks" on a box in an on-line form
contract?5
A third important point about contractual ordering is the distinc-
tion between contracts between immediate parties and those that
"run with" the object. Contracts that run with the object change the
entitlement structure-not just between the immediate parties but for
all parties in a chain of distribution. When contracts that "run with"
the object are also mass uniform contracts of adhesion, then we do
have a change in the overall social entitlement structure. In the realm
53. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 1245-46. Fisher suggests that this problem can be addressed
by imposing limits on the terms of the contracts-primarily by refusing to enforce agreements
outside the permissible range. See id. at 1250. Of course, it is entirely reasonable to suppose
that if moving the terms of the agreements towards these limits is a profit-maximizing trend,
then the content creators will have strong incentives to standardize upon the limits, resulting in a
de facto regime of private legislation.
54. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1197-99. For the most thorough and insightful treat-
ment of the issue of externalities in the context of information content, focusing on media, see
C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,372-83 (1997).
55. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REv. 847, 849-51, 869-74 (1998) (de-
scribing the concerns of online privacy advocates and industry responses); Privacy Online: A
Report to Congress (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/>.
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of information content, we are seeing "running" contracts both that
attempt to expand background intellectual property rights (e.g., by
forbidding reverse engineering) and to cut them back (e.g., the
copyleft General Public License). 6 Given that schemes of "running"
adhesion contracts, like adhesion contracts generally, cannot be ipso
facto valid, how will we determine which of them will be enforceable
(whoever is doing the enforcing)?
The analogy of "residential private government," drawn from the
context of social ordering through land ownership, is instructive. 7
Systems of private covenants, in subdivisions or condominiums, have
been praised as a method of choice-based community creation. But
they have also been criticized, primarily for three reasons: (1) they
are imposed on would-be residents on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; (2)
they have tended to standardize on exclusionary sets of rules that re-
inforce patterns of social power detrimental to poor and minority
persons (and anyone heterodox in lifestyle); and (3) their "private"
character means there is little or no constitutional check on the power
of developers to set their own rules as the market (i.e., the tastes of
those with money) dictates. Judge-made doctrines such as the re-
quirement that running covenants "touch and concern land" have
served to weed out some systems of "running" contractual arrange-
ments, arguably those that are most vulnerable to these kinds of criti-
cisms. It is true that Internet users can more easily exit the rules cre-
ated by one sysop or content provider than condominium or
subdivision dwellers can exit the rules created by the developer. The
possibility of exit will not be of much use, however, if all of the desir-
able sites or content have similar rules.
D. The Issue of Enforcement
It is not clear that "decentralized" contractual law-making on the
Internet for enforcement purposes would result in the desired ends of
diversity and choice. Under the current economic model of the
Internet, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), the home of most sys-
ops, are for-profit commercial entities. One can guess, therefore, that
fiscal concerns will be a factor in the establishment of policies. In
56. See, e.g., Ira V. Heffan, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in The Digital Age, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1492-1504 (1997); Netscape Communicator Open Source Code White Paper
(visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://sitesearch.netscape.com/browsers/future/whitepaper.html>.
57. The term "residential private government" was coined by Uriel Reichman. See Uriel
Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1238 (1982).
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fact, various forms of profit-maximizing myopia might be expected.
One possibility suggested by the residential private government anal-
ogy is oppressive over-regulation. Sysops will prefer those who pay
the most and cause the least "hassle," excluding others; it will be dif-
ficult to impose standards of due process or equal treatment because
this is a "private" ordering. In this scenario, the remedy of exclusion
(banishment) will not be reserved for force and fraud, but rather will
serve to consolidate power and profit.
Another opposite possibility is destructive under-regulation-a
"race to the bottom" among sysops, registration authorities, or other
sub-units of Internet authority, resulting in a "lowest-common de-
nominator" enforcement scheme.8 An analogy is the incorporation
competition among states, with the attendant gradual decrease in
corporate legal liability standards in past decades. 9 If users can arbi-
trage their choice of ISP, for example, then ISPs can in turn switch
their registration authority or TLD. The easy "exit" option of the
citizen of cyberspace may result in weaker or nonexistent enforce-
ment, and the speed at which inhabitants of cyberspace can "cross
borders" may accelerate any trends." A race to the bottom might
cause Internet self-regulation to be too minimal (with respect to
fraud, for example) to keep territorial sovereigns from imposing their
own rules, in which case self-regulation will fail.
Enforcement mechanisms are difficult to establish spontaneously
and maintain through self-organized cooperation. Even if tacit coor-
dination has held almost everyone to standardization on ".com," for
example, why did not the same process arrive at a customary proce-
dure for resolving tussles over domain names, without the necessity
for NSI (or someone) to promulgate mandatory dispute policies?
58. See Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at 87. The "regulatory arbitrage" described by John-
son and Post as making top-down ordering impractical might also have unpleasant effects when
it comes to self-regulation. See id. at 82-84. Rules imposed by sysops would be avoided by sim-
ply changing ISPs. See id. at 84-89.
59. See William L Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 702-05 (1974) (stating the traditional view that the competition for state benefits
resulting from incorporation gives states incentives to choose loose legal rules-those which al-
low managers to exploit investors). But see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 213-18 (1991) (noting that empirical studies
"fatally undermine" Cary's view that shareholders are victimized by incorporation in Delaware).
60. This argument, of course, assumes that a large proportion of Internet users have a
similar orientation with respect to a significant issue. There is a strong counter-argument that
diversity reigns on the Internet in similar (if not greater) proportion than in physical space.
Some issues, however, may result in substantial uniformity-the imposition of Internet-specific
taxation, for example, can be expected to be widely unpopular, thus, generating regulatory arbi-
trage, that is, tax havens in cyberspace.
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Perhaps, as Johnson suggests, the registration authorities can now co-
ordinate on a set of minimal conditions for entry into cyberspace, and
for continued existence there, and perhaps they can impose an
"agreement" to arbitrate in the case of disputes. It seems, however,
that unilateral banishment of those who will not agree to arbitrate or
who fail to accept the terms of the arbitration body is the only ulti-
mate remedy that can be reliably executed by self-ordering.
E. Technological Self-Help
This conclusion seems to be challenged, however, by the advent
of trusted systems. Trusted systems are sophisticated rights-
management programs. They can be programmed to prevent deliv-
ery of a piece of content until payment is received and credited, to
prevent all copying of a piece of content or the making of more than
n copies, to prevent printing a copy or more than n copies, to prevent
reading it more than once or more than n times, to destroy the con-
tent if the user attempts to do something prohibited, and so on.61
Many of the theories for self-ordering in the information context-
the shift from copyright to contract, for example -rest on the assump-
tion that all of the details of these contracts will be rendered self-
enforcing through the use of trusted systems.62
Trusted systems are a species of technological self-help. They
are more like building high fences than relying on nuisance law; more
like moving out the tenant's furniture and changing the lock than re-
lying on landlord-tenant law; and more like sending over a committee
of one's friends to intimidate a storekeeper into paying a debt than
relying on legal enforcement of contract.
A regime of technological self-enforcement by trusted systems is,
in other words, anarchic rather than legal. For anarcho-
cyberlibertarians,63 this distinction is hard to see, but it should be clear
to the rest of us. If trusted systems are the only way to "contract,"
there will be no such thing as "fair use" or "efficient breach." Indeed,
there will be no way to use breach to police purported agreements;
that is, if nobody can breach the offending contract, then the primary
means of testing the legality of the bargain will disappear. Those who
61. See MARK J. STEFIK, INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS
391-94 (1996).
62. For example, Fisher notes that "[s]uch devices ... should be sufficient to keep the leak-
age [of content to unauthorized users] to a tolerable level." Fisher, supra note 3, at 1225.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
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desire not to accede to the strictures of a trusted system will be ban-
ished from access to the content it protects. So technological self-
help regimes return us to the issue of banishment.
CONCLUSION: WHERE ARE WE HEADED?
A final point, then, about public or hybrid enforcement neces-
sary to support a network of contractual self-ordering. Those who
are banished will no doubt resort to the courts in their own countries
or elsewhere in physical space, appealing to legal limitations on such
banishment. So one suspects that enforcement mechanisms will
evolve on the Internet into a hybrid of internal self-regulation and ex-
ternal sovereignty. But what if the Internet becomes a sovereign ju-
risdiction of its own, with its own constitution, courts, and police
force?
A first step in that direction would be for courts in physical space
to recognize the Internet's own jurisdictional space. That is, courts
could develop a kind of comity between the Internet and the territo-
rialized non-virtual world, abstaining from Internet disputes in favor
of the Internet's own processes. But what happens when someone
appeals banishment? If cyberspace really acquired its own sover-
eignty, perhaps other sovereignties would not question its authority
to de-nationalize (banish) its citizens. But perhaps it is more likely
that such an eventuality would cause the world's sovereigns not to
recognize any sovereign's general right to de-nationalize its citizens,
at least where de-nationalization would deny the ability to engage in
meaningful commerce.
It seems far-fetched to be talking about whether cyberspace
could become a sovereign jurisdiction of its own. People do not
physically live there; its government would not organize economic
and social life in a physical space. The premises of sovereignty in
physical space have been territorial; the Internet is unterritorial. Yet
it seems that intermediate regimes might be unstable. Even a regime
of comity between the Internet's own dispute-resolution processes
and enforcement mechanisms and those of the territorialized non-
virtual world will serve to attenuate the territoriality (and territorial
diversity) of sovereignty. In order for a regime of internal arbitration
to work, every territorial sovereign to whom a disappointed "resi-
dent" of cyberspace might appeal must cede a considerable part of its
precious jurisdiction, because every territorial sovereign to whom a
disappointed resident of cyberspace might appeal must agree that all
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those on-line contracts of adhesion are valid and enforceable.
As we suggest, the external courts might stop short of abstention
in certain cases of banishment. Yet, if banishment is the only cyber-
space enforcement mechanism with "teeth," external courts would
have to accept even banishment in most cases if Internet self-
regulation is to be stable. Moreover, the guidelines for the excep-
tional cases in which banishment would not be acceptable, so that an
external court would find it appropriate to step in, would have to be
consistent among all external sovereigns. That requires a lot more
global agreement about due process and public policy limits on con-
tract than we now have. Yet, the apparent alternative-a welter of
conflicting local regulations -threatens to be either ineffective or to
kill the promising commercial goose.
Internet proponents' best hope is for a process of evolution to-
ward a regime in which there is enough harmony about the minimal
standards of background due process and public policy limits so that
all players, on and off the Internet, will understand and accept them.
If such harmony could emerge, it would allow stable self-enforcement
on the Internet, in the shadow of possible appeal to territorial sover-
eigns. We certainly have not reached such harmony yet. The needed
background baseline of due process and public policy limits has a bet-
ter chance of developing if participants do not obscure the under-
standing that contractual ordering cannot exist without it.
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